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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsRONALD EDWIN GALLATLY,

Case No.
11337

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty to the crime of
grand larcency and a denial of a motion for a new trial in
the Second Judicial District, County of Morgan, Stat.e of
Utah, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding.
PHIL L HANSEN
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RONALD E. GALLATLY
Appellant Pro Se
Post Office Box 250
Draper, Utah

Attorney General
GERALD G. GUNDRY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 Stat.e Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

RONALD EDWIN GALLATLY,

Case No.
11337

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Ronald Edwin Gallatly, appeals
from a jury verdict of guilty to the crime of grand
larcency, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-4
(1953). He further appeals the denial of his motion
for a new trial based on grounds of newly discovered evidence.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On November 3, 1967, the appellant by jury
verdict was found guilty of the crime of grand
larceny and was sentenced, February 6, 1968, to the
Utah State Prison for a term of not less than one
year and not more than ten years as provided by
law by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist. On Jan-

2
uary 22, 1968, the appellant moved the trial court
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
A hearing was held the same day and the motion
was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that the conviction of the
appellant for the crime of grand larceny be affirmed
and that the judgment of the trial court denying the
appellant's motion for a new trial be sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about June 8, 1967, a saddle, a bridle, a
rope and a martingale were stolen from Amos
Bingham at Milton, Morgan County, Utah. (R. 63)
Mrs. LeAnn Hill, formerly Miss LeAnn Clark,
testified that on or about the night of June 8, 1967,
she had planned to go on a drinking party with the
appellant, but that she and the appellant decided
to go to the appellant's brother's house at Syracuse,
Utah, to get some rabbits to sell to her uncle. (R. 16,
31) Mrs. Hill testified that she consumed half a fifth
of whiskey while at the house of the appellant's
brother and passed out recalling only that she had
demanded that the appellant take her with him
when he took her car. (R. 17, 34-38) After leaving
Syracuse she had been awakened by the appellant hitting or shoving her and telling her to be
quiet. (R. 18) She awoke the next morning to find a
saddle lying on her bedroom floor (R. 17) and the
appellant sleeping nearby on a sheepskin ruq. (R. 17)

The saddle had the name "Pete" written across its
back. (R. 18) Mrs. Hill testified that the appellant had
referred to the saddle as his saddle (R. 40) and that
he had asked her to keep it for him. (R. 19) The witness stated that she kept the saddle for the appellant, that he subsequently took it to his house for
several days, and that he returned it to her house
thereafter. (R. 19)
Mrs. Hill further testified that the appellant told
her he needed money and directed her to sell the
saddle, (R. 44) stating that if the buyer wanted to
know where the saddle came from, she was to say
she "got it at an auction." (R. 20) The saddle was
sold to Pete Miller for $65.00. (R. 20, 45) Mr. Miller
later called Miss Clark telling her that the saddle
was stolen and that he wanted his money back.
(R. 20, 73, 77) Miss Clark returned the money to Mr.
Miller who had informed the county sheriff about
the stolen saddle. The sheriff took possession of the
saddle. (R. 21)
Testimony of Mrs. Hill showed that she obtained possession of a bridle strap marked as State's
exhibit B from the appellant (R. 22) which was identified by Amos Bingham as one taken from his barn
at about the same time the saddle and the other
items were stolen. (R. 62-63)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PERMITTED THE
CASE TO GO TO THE JURY SINCE THE EVIDENCE
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PRESENTED BY THE STATE WAS SUCH THAT
REASONABLE PERSONS COULD FIND THAT THE
APPELLANT TOOK THE SADDLE WITH FELONIOUS
INTENT.

Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving away the personal property
of another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-1 (1953).
The state concedes and this court has held that
there must be an intent to steal at the time of the
aking and that intent is a necessary element of the
crime of larcency. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-120 (1953).
People v. Miller. 4 Utah 410, 11 Pac. 514 (1886); State
v. Allen. 56 Utah 37, 189 Pac. 84 (1920). However:
... intent is not always disclosed by what one says,
but also by what one does, or fails to say or do in
(a) given situation, together with other facts and
circumstances surrounding (the) transaction. Loper
v. United States, 160 F.2d 293 at 294 (9th Cir.
1947). See State v. Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 279
P.2d 711 (1955).

The elements of the crime of grand larceny were
outlined in State v. Peterson, 110 Utah 413, 174 P.2d
843 (1946) and restated in State v. Shonka. 2 Utah 2d
124 at 126, 276 P.2d 711 at 713 (1955) where the court
held:
"If the evidence favorable to the state, with all
reasonable inferences and intendments that can be
drawn therefrom, could sustain a verdict of guilty
the cause should be submitted to the jury." That
is, the evidence must be such that reasonable minds
could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that each
of the following elements of larceny existed: (1) taking and (2) carrying away of the (3) personal
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property (valued over $50.00) (4) of another (5) by
trespass without the owner's consent (6) with the
intent to steal.

Utah Code Ann.

§

76-38-1 (1953) provides:

Possession of property recently stolen, when the
person in possession fails to make a satisfactory
explanation, shall be deemed prima facie evidence
of guilt.

In State v. Richards. 3 Utah 2d 368 at 370, 284
P.2d 691at692 (19.55) the court said:
This court has stated many times the rule to be
regarded by the court as to the evidence necessary
to prove intent in a larceny case. If the evidence is
such that all reasonable minds should arrive at the
conclusions that the taking was without felonious
intent, then the question becomes one of law, and
the verdict of guilty should be set aside. But if, aft.er
a consideration of all the evidence, reasonable minds
may differ and arrive at opposite conclusions the
findings of the jury must control. (Citing cases.)

In affirming the conviction in Richards, supra.
the court held that considering the defendant's possession of the sheep, his dominion over it, his lack
of other explanation, and his stealth in the appropriation of the animal, the jury might well conclude
that the defendant's intent was to deprive the owner of his property.
In State v. Peppacostas. 17 Utah 2d 197, 407 P.2d
576 (1965) this Court held that the possession and
claimed ownership of a stolen 357 Magnum pistol
by the defendant was sufficient evidence to support
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a conviction for grand larceny. See also State v.
Martinez, ________ Utah 2d, ________ , ________ P.2d ________ (1968).
The evidence presented in the instant case
shows that the appellant was found asleep in the
home of LeAnn Clark with a saddle he claimed to
be his and which he moved to his own house and
back to Miss Clark's He asked LeAnn Clark to sell
the saddle for him. The evidence also shows that
he had had possession of a bridle strap which was
one of the other items stolen along with the saddle.
Under the facts of this case the appellant's possession of the saddle by itself was sufficient to establish prima fade evidence against him. All of the facts
taken together were s11fficient to permit the jury to
determine that the appellant took the saddle with
felonious intent at the time of the taking.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE.

The appellant apparently contends that the trial
court erred in not granting his motion for a change
of venue since several members of the jury had
heard rumors about the case.
Utah Code Ann.

§

77-30-21 (1953) provides:

. . . no person shall be disqualified as a juror by
reason of having formed or expressed an opinion
upon the matter of cause submitted to such jury
founded upon public rumor ... , provided it appears
to the court, upon his declaration under oath or
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otherwise, that he can and will, notwithstanding
such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the
matters submitted to him. The challenge may be
oral, but must be entered in the minutes of the
court or noted by the reporter.

In the instant case there is no evidence showing that any juror had formed or expressed an
opinion as to the appellant's guilt or innocence
prior to trial. The members of the jury were sworn to
act impartially and fairly on the matters submitted
to them.
The court granted the appellant's challenges to
prospective jurors where it was shown that a juror
was a first cousin to the sheriff (R. 6) or a friend of
Amos Bingham, the ovvner of the stolen property
(R. 4) or had personal knowledge of the case (R. 4,
6, 7) or was a part-time sheriff. (R. 6)
In the abseEce of showing prejudice it is presumed that the appellant received a fair trial and the
burden is on the appellant to establish his right to
a change of venue. State v. Hunt. 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406
P.2d 208 (1965); Leah v. State. Okla. Cr. 398 P.2d 857
(1965). See McGuffey v. Turner. 18 Utah 2d 354, 423
P.2d 166 (1967).
The denial of the appellant's motion for a
change of venue is not error where there is no evidence adduced to esta_blish prejudice against the
appellant. State v. Eldridge, 197 Kan. 694, 421 P.2d
170 (1966); State v. Bareck, 143 Mont. 273, 389 P.2d
170 (1964).
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This court held that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant or deny a motion for
a change of venue under Utah Code Ann. § 77-26-1
(1953), and that in the absence of showing abuse the
trial courts judgment should be affirmed. State v.
Smith, 11 Utah 2d 287, 358 P.?.d 342 (1961); State v.
Green. 86 Utah 192, 40 P.2d 961 (1935); State v. Kazda,
15 Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964).
In State v. Green, supra, the examination of the
jurors in a homocide prosecution showed that many
of them had read or heard something about the
case, but it did not appear that there was any serious
difficulty in securing a iury. The court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denyinq
the defendant's motion for a chanqe in venue.
Respondent submits that there is no evidence
showing that there was any difficulty in securing a
jury or that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the appellant's motion for a change of
venue.
Appellant contends that it was error for the
court to permit relatives of Amos Bingham to sit as
jurors. However, the record is devoid of any evidence showing that any relative of Mr. Bingham was
a member of the jury. At most the record shows that
the peremptory chaJlenge to second cousin of the
sheriff was denied. (R. 6) Since the sheriff was not
the person injured and it does not appear that the
sheriff signed the complaint instituting the prosecution against the appellant, it cannot be claimed this
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was error under provisions of Utah Code Ann.
77-30-19(1) (1953).

§

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

In his supplemental brief the appellant contends that the trial court erred in not granting his
motion for a new trial based on evidence discovered
subsequent to the appellant's conviction of grand
larceny.
The newly discovered evidence consisted of a
statement by the appellant that he did not testify at
his trial on the advise of his attorney (Supp. Tr. 12);
that he had tried to protect LeAnn Clark (Hill) (Supp.
Tr. 7); that he did not take the saddle (Supp. Tr. 7);
that before his trial he knew that Dick Crane was
involved in the theft (Supp. Tr. 8, 14); that he did not
tell his attorney about "these things" until after his
trial and conviction (Supp. Tr. 8); and that he knew
before the trial about the testimony that would be
introduced against him by LeAnn Clark (Supp. Tr.
13).
The appellant called Fred Batchelor, an inmate
at the Weber County Jail, who testified that Dick
Crane had told him that Ronald Gallatly was in jail
for a crime that Crane had committed. (Supp. Tr. 22,
24)

Another inmate, Guy Gaily, testified that he had
discussed with LeAnn Clark (Hill) during the period

of investigation of the theft, several explanations
which she could give to the police as to how she
had come into possession of the saddle. (Supp. Tr.
28)
Kenneth Gallatly, brother of the appellant, testified that a saddle with the word "Pete" had been in
his barn before the episode about the rabbits (Supp.
Tr. 37) and that the appellant was with him at his
house on the night he was supposed to have been
at Miss Clark's house. (Supp. Tr. 41)
In his brief the appellant asserts that the prosecution admitted that the evidence supported a conviction only for receiving stolen property. The record shows that the prosecution talked with the
appellant about pleading guilty to receiving stolen
property stating that "this was the least you were
guilty of in view of the evidence .... " (Supp. Tr. 13)
Utah Code Ann.

§

77-38-3(7) (1953) provides:

When a verdict or decision has been rendered
against the defendant the court may, upon his application, grant a new trial ...
When new evidence has h e e n discovered,
material to the defendant and which he could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial.

"Newly discovered evidence" must be evidence which was not discoverable with reasonable
diligence, State v. Hawkins, 81 Utah 16, 16 P.2d 713
(1932) and the burden of proving diligence is on the
defendant. United States v. Fassoulis, 203 F. Supp.
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114 (D.C.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Edwards, 366
F.2d 853, (2d Cir. 1966), cert. den. 386 U.S. 908. Furthermore, application for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence should be considered with
caution. Long v. United States. 139 F.2d 652 (C.C.A.
Okl. 1944).
In United States v. Smith, 179 F.Supp. 684
(D.C.D.C. 1959), aff'd 283 F.2d 607, 109 U.S. App. D.C.
28 (1960), cert. den. 364 U.S. 938 (1961), in considering a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the court held that the rule has always been that newly discovered evidence must
be evidence which could not have been discovered
by the exercise of due diligence for use at the trial.
Facts within the knowledge of the accused at
the time of trial are not newly discovered and will
not authorize a new trial even though he did not
make these facts known to his counsel until after
trial. People v. English, 68 C.A.2d 670, 157 P.2d 429
(1945). The reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from withholding evidence and speculating
on the outcome, and, if it turns out adversly to him,
later seek to employ the evidence he withheld as
grounds for a new trial State v. Payne, 195 Ore. 624,
244 P.2d 1025 (1952).
In the instant case the appellant admitted that
he had knowledge before his trial of the evidence
he introduced as "newly discovered evidence." In
this case there is no sound reason why the evidence
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presented by the appellant should be considered as
"newly discovered evidence" entitling the appellant to a new trial.
It is well established that the trial court has
broad discretion in determining whether or not to
grant a new trial based on insufficient evidence or
on newly discovered evidence. State v. Cooper. 114
Utah S31, 201 P.2d 764 (1949); State v. Duncan. 102
Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121 (1942). The evidence presented by the appellant was insufficient to have warranted the trial court granting a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence. There is no showing
that the trial court abused its discretion.
CONCLUSION
1. There was sufficient evidence from which the
jury could reasonably find that the appellant took
the saddle with felonious intent at the time of the
taking.

2. The evidence does not support appellant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying appellant's motion for a change of
venue.
3. The appellant failed to prove that his alleged
"newly discovered evidence" was in fact newly
discovered evidence within the meaning of Utah
Code Ann. § 77-38-3(7) (1953).
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For the reasons states the respondent requests
that the judgment of the trial court be affirmea.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GERALD G. GUNDRY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

